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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is intended to sketch the definition of a methodological tool – the notion of 
a format of representation – for the study of scientific theorising. “Theorising”, as I 
understand it, comprises the various reasoning tasks scientists perform in their practice of 
science: hypotheses forging, developing, comparing, and testing, as well as teaching, 
communicating, giving arguments in controversies, etc. All these activities imply the 
construction and use of models, which are at the same time expressions of the theoretical 
structure from which they might be drawn, representations of the phenomena, and tools for 
predicting and explaining them. 
The various functions of models are generally conceived of as depending on their 
representational function: a model is a device standing for a target system in virtue of some 
relationship between its features and features of the system. This representational relationship 
enables scientists to draw inferences concerning the target system by reasoning with – which 
sometimes implies literally manipulating – the model. 
At least two kinds of questions arise concerning the representational function of 
scientific models. The first one concerns the semantic relationship between the model and the 
target; it has been coined the “constitution question” by Callender and Cohen (2006): What 
does the representational relationship between models and their target consist in? And how 
does it enable scientists to infer successfully from properties of the model to properties of the 
target? This kind of question has been much addressed in the recent literature (see, e.g., 
Suárez, 1999, 2003, 2004, Frigg, 2002, 2006, 2009, French, 2003) and is often referred to as 
“THE problem of scientific representation”. Answers to these questions have to handle the 
problem of the truth and accuracy of the descriptions provided by models, given that various 
abstractions, idealisations, and approximations are made in modelling physical systems. This 
paper will not tackle such issues. 
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The second kind of questions concerns the relationship between the model and its 
user. To be clear: in reasoning with models, scientists gain knowledge concerning the target 
by inferring from properties of the model to properties of the target. But, beforehand, they 
have to gain knowledge about the content of the model itself: the information they need is not 
always displayed in an immediately readable form in the model, and they have to “make it 
speak”, so to speak. The question is: How do models enable cognitive agents to obtain 
information within them, independently of the true or approximately true statements that can 
be inferred about their target? In terms of Hughes’ (1997) “DDI” (for Denotation-
Demonstration-Interpretation) account, the question concerns the second step, namely 
“demonstration”: once the model is designed, and before the sentences concerning it are 
interpreted as sentences about the target, the scientist has to use the “internal dynamics” of the 
model, as Hughes calls it, in order to “read off” the information within the model. This paper 
is centred on this second kind of questions. More precisely, I aim at providing a tool to 
analyse the interaction between what Hughes metaphorically calls the “internal dynamics” of 
models, and agents’ reasoning abilities. 
Tackling this issue requires that one first makes more precise what is to be understood 
by “model”. Indeed, this term is highly polysemic, ranging from abstract mathematical 
structures or idealised systems to particular graphs, equations, and even 3D material models. 
But the fundamental assumption of this paper is that the reasoning processes undertaken by 
agents in order to gain knowledge within a model are always led on formatted representations. 
In other words, I assume that agents do not reason with models in abstracto: even when they 
use abstract or imaginary models such as, for instance, the simple pendulum, they always 
reason with a particular equation or graph. More generally, I will consider all the concrete 
devices1 (both linguistic and non-linguistic) scientists construct, use, and manipulate in their 
practice of science: equations, diagrams, linguistic descriptions, graphs, pictorial images, 3D 
material models2. These will be my units of analysis for the study of the user-model 
interaction. From now on, in this paper, “model” has to be understood in this restricted sense 
of concrete representing device. 
                                                
1 In some cases, one can certainly reason with a model by merely imagining it, without a graph or an equation 
being there in black and white, written down on a paper. Acknowledging that one nevertheless always reasons 
on formatted representations means that, even in this case, one does not draw inferences on, say, a pendulum, 
without couching it – even mentally – in some particular graph or equation. For the sake of simplicity, I will 
exclusively focus on external representing devices. 
2 I will not consider simulations here, although it would be a valuable extension of my account. 
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Acknowledging that reasoning is always led on formatted representations goes hand in 
hand with another initial assumption of this paper: the particular form of a representation 
matters to its user’s reasoning processes. Independently of what is being modelled, different 
kinds of representational media do not facilitate the same kind of inferences. In consequence, 
following Paul Humphreys (2004), I claim that attention has to be paid to the computational 
aspects and to the tractability of our theoretical tools, in parallel to their representational 
relationship to the phenomena. Therefore, as he suggests, one should focus on the “concrete 
pieces of syntax” that are constructed and used in prediction and explanation. 
My perspective, though, is substantially different from Humphreys’. His proposal is 
meant to do justice to the increasing importance of the use of computers in scientific practice, 
and his notion of “template” is not centred on the individual agent with limited cognitive 
abilities, but rather on what it is possible to calculate, in practice, once we have “extended” 
our computing abilities by means of extremely powerful computers. However, I am interested 
in the user-model interaction, from the perspective of the individual agent, taking into account 
his cognitive limitations, personal skills, background knowledge, prior beliefs, interests, etc. 
Therefore, the individual differences between agents become central to my picture of 
theorising. The inferences an agent typically does to gain knowledge within a model depend 
both on the particular form (or “syntax”) of the representation and on his cognitive abilities. 
And I claim that paying attention to this double dependence is a fruitful method to analyse 
scientific theorising. 
In section 2, I define the notion of the format of a representation in terms of the 
inferences this representation enables a particular agent to do, taking into account both the 
“syntax” of the representation and the agent’s cognitive abilities and interests. In section 3, I 
give a broad outline of two case studies – classical mechanics and Feynman’s diagrams – to 
show how focusing on concrete representing devices and analysing them in terms of formats, 
as defined in section 2, might well shed some light on various important aspects of theorising. 
 
 
2. Formats 
 
The definition I give of the notion of format in this section relies on “toy” examples, 
which are chosen to make the definition clear, without raising specific issues concerning the 
use of models in theorising. How formats, so defined, enable us tackle such issues is studied 
in section 3. 
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2.1 Representations and their informational content 
 
Let me start with the following picture of representation, or, better said, of a 
representation-situation (R-situation): an agent or a group of agents is/are using a device (the 
representation) to represent some feature of the world (the target), in some context and for 
some purpose3. The representation can be any external device or artefact4, marks on a paper 
or on a computer screen, a 3D material object, etc., whose perceptual properties are accessible 
to the user5. The target can be a system, properties of a system, the evolution of some value, 
the relation between various values, an event, a pattern, etc. A representation can be used for 
various purposes (e.g. mnemonic, aesthetic, epistemic). I will only consider epistemic, or 
knowledge-seeking uses of representations; this refers to all the situations in which a 
representation is used to draw inferences concerning its target6. 
I restrict my analysis to representations that function in virtue of a representational 
scheme, as defined by Haugeland (1991, 172), namely such that “(i) a variety of possible 
contents can be represented by a corresponding variety of possible representations; (ii) what 
any given representation […] represents is determined in some consistent or systematic way 
by the scheme […]; and (iii) there are proper (and improper) ways of producing maintaining, 
modifying, and/or using the various representations under various environmental and other 
conditions.” Focusing on external representations, one can describe how they function within 
a scheme by referring, following the Goodmanian tradition7, to their syntax and semantics8. 
Rules for producing and interpreting representations can be of very different kinds, according 
to the scheme in which they function. Some representations are produced by using natural 
                                                
3 This is roughly the conception advocated by Giere (2006, 60). 
4 In this paper, I focus on external representations. Integrating some results of works on mental representations, 
and on their interactions with external ones, in particular from the perspective of distributed cognition (see, e.g. 
Clark, 1997), would certainly be a valuable extension of my account. 
5 This does not imply any particular theory of perception, and is just meant to exclude abstract objects such as 
mathematical structures, propositions, or fictions, as well as unobservable things. 
6 Knowledge-seeking uses of representations are more comprehensive than genuine scientific representations: 
using a map to know how far Washington is from New York is a knowledge-seeking use. Without getting into 
this issue, I would be inclined to adopt Callender and Cohen’s (2006) claim that a demarcation criterion for 
scientific representations cannot be found in any special semantics, but rather in pragmatic aspects of their uses. 
7 This tradition stems from Goodman (1968/1976). 
8 Kulvicki (2003) gives a detailed account of representational systems in such terms. 
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causal processes (e.g. photographs, electron micrographs, X-ray images); some rely on much 
more arbitrary relationships between their properties and their content (e.g. languages). 
What is there to be understood by the “content” of a representation? Since my analysis 
concentrates on the knowledge-seeking uses of representation, I only consider their 
informational content (as opposed, for instance, to what Goodman calls their “expressive 
content”). Before giving a more precise definition of what I mean by “informational content”, 
let me state that a piece of information is any propositional content that it can be the object of 
belief9. 
The perceptual properties of a representation standing for a target in virtue of some 
representational scheme are signals carrying information about this target for agents 
mastering this scheme. Such agents can in principle extract this information from the 
representation and thus gain knowledge about the target. This implies at least two steps10. 
For one’s knowledge-seeking enterprise to be successful, one has to know which 
elements of the model refer, what kind of approximations and idealisations were made in 
producing the representation, and many other things concerning the status and the accuracy of 
the information one extracts from the model. Consider a graph representing the variations of 
temperature in Paris during 2008. According to how precise one wants one’s knowledge about 
the temperature in Paris in 2008 to be, one might want to know how and at what time of the 
day measurements were taken, how accurate the thermometer was, etc. In other words, one 
has to be able to interpret the information carried by the graph as information about the 
temperature in Paris. This is where misrepresentations can happen. For instance, if I take the 
graph to be about Paris, whereas it displays data obtained by measurements that were taken in 
Madrid, my knowledge-seeking enterprise fails; likewise if I believe the numerals shown in 
the graph to represent the exact value of the temperature during the whole day, whereas they 
were taken at 8am every morning. 
But, before inferring – soundly or not – from the features of the graph to the features 
of its target, one has to know how to read the graph itself, in order to extract information from 
it. The graph functions under a particular representational scheme. This scheme determines 
which of its features are syntactically relevant properties, and how they are to be interpreted. 
Let me insist: reading off the information from the graph – even before interpreting it as 
about Paris – requires the knowledge of the scheme’s semantic rules (although not necessarily 
                                                
9 I don’t exclude the possibility of non-linguistic propositional contents. 
10 They are often simultaneous, but need to be distinguished by the analysis. As will appear, they correspond to 
the two kinds of questions about the representational function of models mentioned in the introduction. 
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of its actual referent), and not only of its syntax. In other words, the representation itself has 
content, independently of whether it is about some target or not. Consider again a graph of 
temperature in function of time: whether it is taken to be about Paris, about Madrid, or about 
any other place, even fictional or not specified, there is a sense in which it “says” to its user 
that the temperature was of 0°C on January 10th. It does contain such information, whether it 
is true of any real place or not. And, if no numerals feature on the graph, I can still state that 
the temperatures increase or fall over time. Whether one can genuinely speak of 
representation and informational content when there is no actual referent is a difficult issue, 
which I shall not tackle here11. But, since I will not consider issues concerning successful 
representations or misrepresentations, it is worth stating clearly that I take the liberty not to 
use the term “information” as a success term; rather, I use “informational content” to refer to 
the set of all statements that can in principle be made within a model by an agent who masters 
the scheme under which it functions, whether or not this agent is mistaken concerning the 
target, and whether or not there is any such target. 
Thus, the informational content of a representation consists in the set of all the pieces 
of information, at any level of abstraction, which an agent mastering its scheme could, in 
principle, extract from it and put in explicit12 form. As for the levels of abstraction13, consider 
again a graph representing the variations of the temperature in Paris in 2008. One can read off 
information at various levels of abstraction: one can infer that temperature was of 0°C on 
January 10th, that it was colder in January 10th than in June 20th, that temperature globally 
increased from February to June, etc. Note that the informational content, so construed, is 
infinite: one can also infer that temperature on January 10th was less than 1°C, and less than 
2°C, etc. “In principle” means that the definition of the informational content does not take 
into account whether the cognitive abilities and personal interests of agents, which direct their 
inferences, will practically lead them to extract such or such information. Neither does it take 
into account how difficult it is to extract different pieces of information. Therefore, the 
                                                
11 This raises the difficult problem of fictions. One more problem is: when exactly can we say that a principle 
such as Newton’s Second Law, which, as such, does not have any representational content, becomes a 
representation: once the forces are specified? Or once precise values are given to the variables? It makes sense, 
here, to speak of levels of interpretation. And, even at the most abstract level, speaking of pure “syntax” (as 
Humphreys, 2004, about his “templates”) seems to be a non-standard use, since there is always at least a 
minimal mathematical interpretation. 
12 I understand “explicit” in an intuitive sense. For a detailed analysis, see e.g. (Kirsh, 1991) 
13 For a recent analysis of this notion, see (Floridi, 2008). 
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informational content of a representation depends on its perceptual features and on the 
scheme under which it functions, but it is an “objective” notion, in the sense that it is not 
agent-relative14. 
 
2.2 Informational content versus cognitively accessible content 
 
In practice, though, all the pieces of information contained in a representation are not 
equally easy to access, and some are practically inaccessible without the aid of external 
devices (such as computers). Unlike its informational content, the cognitively accessible 
content of a representation is agent-relative. When no more precision is given, I assume the 
agent to be an average human adult with normal cognitive abilities (this excludes, for 
instance, blind subjects, babies, or subjects with exceptional computational capacities). 
According to the kind of representation one is dealing with and to the kind of information one 
is seeking, obtaining this information might require various cognitive operations, which might 
be mentally processed, and which sometimes consist in drawing other external representations 
from the original one, with the help, for instance, of pencil and paper. This process has a 
certain cognitive cost. The cognitive cost required to obtain a particular piece of information 
depends both on the representation and on the agent. 
One can say that a piece of information has actually been obtained when it is explicitly 
displayed, either mentally or in the external representation which might result from the 
process of drawing another representation from the original one (think, for example, of the 
process of solving an equation with pencil and paper, which results in the writing down of its 
solutions). The cognitive cost that an agent will typically have to pay to obtain a piece of 
information from a representation is inversely proportional to the relative immediacy of the 
availability of this piece of information, as defined by John Kulvicki (2009). A piece of 
information is immediately available for an agent if it is (i) displayed in extractable form15; 
                                                
14 It is certainly agent-dependent, in the sense that nothing is a representation unless someone uses it as such; but 
it does not depend on the actual inferences agents typically draw from the representation. See page 7 for more 
precision on this point. 
15 A piece of information is extractable if there is a “non-semantic feature of the representation in virtue of 
possessing which it carries the piece of information in question and no other, more specific piece of information” 
(Kulvicki, 2009). In other words, it is extractable if no inference, even very quick, is required to put it in an 
explicit form. 
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(ii) syntactically salient16; and (iii) semantically salient17. Syntactic and semantic salience 
depend, as Kulvicki shows, on the user’s cognitive abilities, and they are a matter of degree. 
Indeed, a map where shades of red and green stand for ranges of temperature would display 
some information in an immediately available form for a subject with normal perceptual 
abilities, but not for a colour-blind subject. According to the colour contrast, this information 
is more or less syntactically salient (for the normal subject). As for semantic salience: a 
diagram representing the succession of historical events on a time’s arrow starting from the 
right would display information in a less immediately available form than if it started from the 
left, though one could get used to such scheme. 
Therefore, the so-called “immediacy” of availability of a piece of information (and, 
accordingly, the cognitive cost required to obtain it) also admits degrees, depending (i) on the 
relative syntactic and semantic salience of the perceptual features of the representation that 
either display the desired piece of information in extractable form, or facilitate the inferential 
process the agent will typically perform in order to obtain this information (either mentally or 
by drawing a representation where this piece of information lies in an – absolutely –
immediately available form), (ii) on the relative cognitive cost of this latter process. 
Hence, different pieces of the informational content of a representation are not equally 
cognitively costly to access. Consider again the graph representing the variation of the 
temperature in Paris. Reading off the value of the temperature at time t, as well as assessing 
its global evolution are easy (not costly) tasks for an average user; in Kulvicki’s terms, these 
pieces of information are immediately available. Now, for instance, giving the exact value of 
the difference between temperature on June 20th and on January 10th, however it is not very 
costly, requires some cognitive operations, and even in some cases the use of pencil and paper 
to write down the values and make the subtraction (e.g. for children, or if the values are very 
precise). 
Likewise, some pieces of information within a representation are not equally easy to 
obtain for different users. For example, the solutions of an equation are more immediately 
available, or less costly to obtain, for a trained mathematician than for a beginner. 
                                                
16 A piece of information displayed in an extractable form is syntactically salient if the properties of the 
representation responsible for this information are perceptually salient. 
17 Semantic salience depends on the relationship between perceptual properties of the representation and the data 
to which they correspond. For example, a map of temperature were shades of red would stand for cold areas and 
shades of blue for warm areas would be less semantically salient, given our habits, than the reverse. 
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Finally, two representations can contain (partially or totally) the same information, 
though displaying it in such different ways that they do not make the same pieces of 
information equally accessible. To borrow one of Kulvicki’s (2009) examples, the results of a 
temperature survey can be presented as a list of triples of numerals, the first two standing for 
the coordinates of the different places where measurements were taken and the third one for 
the corresponding temperature values; the very same data can be presented in a two-
dimensional diagram, on which the locations of the triples of numerals keep the relative 
distance between the places where measurements were taken. Colours corresponding to 
ranges of temperatures could also be added. The information contained in these three 
representations is the same. But the diagrams, and particularly the coloured one, make some 
information much more easily available: for instance, one can quickly assess the relative 
temperature of different areas. In order to extract such information from the corresponding list 
of numerals, one would need to achieve various inferential steps. But, if one is seeking the 
value of the temperature for given coordinates, one will rather use the list. 
To sum up, the relative accessibility of a piece of information depends on the 
perceptual properties of the representation, on the scheme under which it functions, and on the 
agent’s cognitive abilities (which include his skills, training, perceptual abilities, habits, 
background knowledge, prior beliefs, and particular interests). Within a representation, 
different pieces are not equally easy to access for a given agent, and the same piece of 
information might not be equally easy to access for different agents; and finally, two 
representations can have the same content without making the same pieces of information 
easily accessible. 
 
2.3 Formats: a definition 
 
According to our common understanding of the word “format”, it makes perfectly 
sense to say that the list of numerals and the diagrams mentioned above are in different 
formats. My aim is to define the very notion of format in terms of the type of inferences18 
particular representations facilitate for individual agents with particular cognitive abilities. 
                                                
18 To dispel any ambiguity: though my account is compatible with and sympathetic to Suárez’s (2004) inferential 
conception, it does not have the same status. Suárez claims that the representational relationship between models 
and the world consists in their enabling us to draw inferences about the phenomena (which corresponds to the 
first question stated in introduction); my point is to study the inferential processes agents perform within the 
model (second question). 
 10 
Therefore, the format of a representation depends on its perceptual features, but also on the 
agent who is using it, and on the particular situation in which it is used (which includes the 
kind of information the agent is seeking); it is a highly context-dependent notion. 
Consider a particular R-situation, where an agent a is using a representation r standing 
for some target in virtue of some representational scheme in order to draw a certain type of 
information. Let me call I the full informational content of r19. I define the format of r in this 
R-situation as the type of r’s inferential enabling for a. The inferential enabling of r for a is a 
function of the different cognitive costs, which a will typically have to pay in order to draw 
different pieces of information from r. In other words, the relative length of the inferential 
processes that a would typically require to obtain the various pieces of information she might 
be seeking. One can, in addition, define the distance in format between two representations r1 
and r2 for agent a as the typical inferential length – or cognitive cost – required for a to draw 
r2 from r1. 
Therefore, the format of a representation is agent- and context-relative, in addition to 
depending on the representational scheme and on the perceptual features of the representation. 
This is an important difference with apparently close notions, such as Goodman’s 
(1968/1976) “symbol systems” or Haugeland’s “representational schemes”. Certainly, there is 
a sense in which a representational scheme depends on the users of the representations: 
reading Chinese characters, for instance, requires some abilities that only some agents 
possess; moreover, to assess whether such “black wiggly line on white backgrounds” is a 
“momentary electrocardiogram” representing heartbeats or “a drawing of Mt. Fujiyama”20 
depends on the user’s knowing the scheme in which it is intended to be read. But formats, as I 
define them, are agents-relative in stronger a sense: although it seems counterintuitive, the 
“same” equation, that is, the same marks on a paper, intended to represent the same values, in 
virtue of the same representational scheme, is not in the same format for a trained 
mathematician who can immediately see the typical form of its solutions as for the beginner 
                                                
19 Within I, certainly, some pieces of information are irrelevant to a’s inquiry. The particular kind of information 
a is seeking is part of the R-situation and of the determination of the format: it directs her inferences in such a 
way that some pieces of I will absolutely not be considered. I could hence exclude from my definition the 
cognitive cost needed to access irrelevant pieces of information; nevertheless, since these inferential processes 
will typically not happen, keeping them aside would be useless. In addition, this accommodates with the case 
where unexpected – though relevant – information is found in a reasoning process. 
20 Goodman, 1976, 229-230. 
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who needs pencil, paper, and time, to achieve the reasoning that might lead him to the same 
results.  
Conversely, any difference in the perceptual properties of two representations does not 
necessarily count as a change in format, since it is not necessarily a change in the inferential 
enabling of the representation for the agent. For instance, in a graph representing the motion 
of a pendulum, the relevant properties are the coordinates of the points representing its 
position in function of time. The colour of the line does not matter: whether the line is blue or 
red, the inferential enabling is the same. Now, if one wants to represent the motions of two 
different pendulums with different frequency of oscillations, it can be useful to draw the two 
lines in different colours. A bicolour graph with two colours reduces the cost of some 
inferences. Therefore, the bicolour and the unicolour graph are not in the same format – 
though their formats are quite close. However, for a colour-blind person, they are in the same 
formats. Finally, if one draws a graph representing the motion of a pendulum with various 
colours, corresponding for instance to the varying temperature of the room, the format again 
changes, since more information is available; and if one is only interested in the position of 
the pendulum, the colours create a useless noise, which can render inferences concerning the 
position less easy than in the case of a unicolour graph. 
A precision is needed concerning the definition of formats as types of inferential 
enabling. Till now, I have been comparing between particular representations having the same 
target and at least partially the same informational content, in terms of their inferential 
enabling for individual agents. However, one would like to be able to say that two 
representations, which do not have the same target, hence having different informational 
content and incomparable inferential enabling21, can nevertheless be in the same format. For 
instance, there must be a way to state that a map of Paris and a map of London at the same 
scale, representing the same type of aspects of both cities (roads, touristic highlights, etc.), are 
in the same format. Resorting to counterfactuals, one could argue that for a representation a of 
target A to be in the same format as a representation b of target B means that, if the process by 
which A has been constructed had been exactly the same, except that B would stand instead of 
A (wherever and however it features in this process), the inferential enabling of a and b would 
have been the same. This might not be very satisfactory, but let me just assume, for now, that 
                                                
21 Since inferential enabling is defined as a function of the relative accessibility of particular pieces of 
information, if no piece of information is common to two representations, their inferential enabling is 
incomparable. 
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there can be a notion of format as a type of inferential enabling, corresponding to types of 
inferences and types of information. 
The notion of format, so defined, is a comparative tool rather than a tool to characterise 
isolated representations in given R-situations. Indeed, it is certainly practically impossible to 
measure the inferential enabling of some representation for an agent. But it is possible to 
compare the format of a representation for different agents, as well as the respective formats 
of two representations for the same agent, and to assess their distance. As to the second case, 
it enables us characterising differences between equations and graphs, linguistic descriptions 
and images, but also between representations belonging to the same type of representational 
schemes (linguistic, iconic, diagrammatic, etc.): two equations or two graphs in different 
coordinates, for instance. As such, it has to be distinguished from the philosophical analyses 
of the differences between types of symbol systems (Goodman, 1968/1976) or what 
Haugeland (1991) calls “representational genera”. Of course, there might be typical 
inferential enablings associated to different types of systems – and many analyses, in the field 
of Artificial Intelligence and cognitive science have shown how diagrammatic representations 
can dramatically enhance agents’ problem-solving capacities22. Such studies are of course 
relevant to my analysis. But my point is to define the very notion of format – of which we 
have a common intuitive understanding – in terms of inferential enabling for particular agents. 
As a result, it helps us gather various phenomena, which are not usually captured under the 
same heading. 
Why insist so much on agents’ relativity of formats? Our common understanding of 
the word “format” might make us feel reticent about admitting that the same equation 
standing for the same values in virtue of the same scheme is in two different formats for two 
different agents. Indeed, in many cases, assuming a human agent with average cognitive 
abilities – or, in the context of a study of theorising, assuming a scientist with the same skills 
and background knowledge as other members of his scientific community – seems natural. To 
qualify a change in coordinate as a change in format, or the difference between a list of 
numerals and a map as a difference in format, one does need to appeal to psychological 
peculiarities of individual agents. Nevertheless, as soon as one takes into consideration 
inferential aspects, that is, epistemic differences, as opposed to logical differences, it is quite 
                                                
22 See, e.g., Larkin and Simon, 1987. For a study from the perspective of distributed cognition, see Zhang, 1997. 
Sometimes, such considerations come along with cognitive hypotheses concerning the format of mental 
representations (see Johnson-Laird, 1983). But such hypotheses are not required for an external descriptive 
analysis such as mine.  
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difficult to draw a clear-cut frontier between such epistemic differences and psychological 
ones. Once representations are approached from the perspective of the inferences one can 
draw with them, agents are an important parameter. And once agents are in the picture, 
differences between agents have to be considered to give a precise definition of formats. 
In addition, and more importantly for my purpose, there are issues concerning 
theorising in which individual differences matter much. For example, for a study of scientific 
learning or popularising, the question of the individual skills of agents is crucial. Normative 
issues concerning the best way to teach theories could be stated in terms of formats. Beside, 
learning a theory could be described as a process of changing – in fact, reducing – the 
distance in formats between the different representations that are used in this theory. More 
simply, when we learn mental calculation, we get skilled in such a way that the distance 
between a problem and its solution gets smaller. This corresponds to a very intuitive idea of 
what becoming an expert means, as the case of Classical Mechanics will suggest below. 
Agents’ relativity of formats does not prove useful only in expert-novice cases. As the 
case of Feynman’s diagrams will show, there are examples where, even between experts, 
different skills, individual preferences, and theoretical commitments, make a difference in the 
use of theoretical representations, which can fruitfully be treated in terms of formats. 
 
 
3. Two cases 
 
3.1 Classical Mechanics 
 
Classical Mechanics can be expressed under various formulations (Newtonian, 
Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, Hamilton-Jacobi theory), which are generally considered as 
equivalent, since a chain of mathematical deduction lead from any of them to any other. The 
differences between them can be assessed in various ways: by comparing their fundamental 
principles (Newton’s Law versus Principle of Least Action under its various forms), their 
mathematical language (differential equations versus variational principles, scalar versus 
vectorial quantities), their basic concepts (force versus energy), the system of coordinates they 
use to describe the motion of mechanical systems (Cartesian coordinates versus generalised 
coordinates, the latter being different in the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian formulations), or 
the form of the equations of motion they result in (second order versus first order). 
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Since the formulations are logically and empirically equivalent23, there is a sense in 
which these differences are “purely formal”. Nevertheless, although it is surely not a case of 
theory reduction or of incommensurability, one might intuitively feel like describing these 
differences as conceptual, or as differences in the way they represent the world. However, a 
difference in representation should mean that the various formulations do not have the same 
truth conditions, which is not the case. 
In parallel to studies of the formulations of mechanics in terms of their underlying 
mathematical structure, or to approaches – more historical in character – focusing on the 
evolving concepts, principles, and laws of mechanics24, I suggest that one could adopt a local 
perspective. By “local”, I mean that, instead of considering the whole edifice of mechanics, 
one could look at the “concrete pieces of syntax”, to borrow Humphreys’ expression, that are 
used in theorising, and assess their differences in terms of format25. This might shed some 
light on the issues raised above. 
Consider the description of the motion of a physical system – e.g., the bob of a grandfather 
clock – by means of the laws of Mechanics. As mentioned above, I deliberately ignore, in this 
paper, the difficult issues of idealisation and abstraction, and I adopt a naïve glance on the 
relationship between the grandfather clock and its idealised representation as a simple 
pendulum. Since I am interested in how inferences are processed within the model, 
understood as the particular equation or graph used by the agent, let me assume, for the sake 
of the argument, that there exists such object as the simple pendulum26 (that the grandfather 
clock is a simple pendulum) and that the equations of mechanics are used to gain knowledge 
about its behaviour. “Gain knowledge”, here, can refer to various situations: when an expert 
inquires into the mathematical consequences of an equation in order to develop his theory, as 
well as when a student learns how to describe and predict the typical behaviour of mechanical 
                                                
23 This equivalence would require further analysis, which is not within the scope of this paper. See, e.g., (North, 
2009). Some studies of mechanics in the structuralist view of theories, such as (Balzer et al., 1987) show that this 
equivalence is far from trivial. However, that does not matter for my argument. 
24 The most famous of such analyses is probably the one given by Mach, 1883. To be clear: my point is not to 
show that such analyses are fruitless, but to propose another way to approach these issues. 
25 In a different vein, see (Wimsatt & Griesemer, 1987), for a detailed assessment of the advantages of using 
“isolable” representations as units of analysis for a study of conceptual evolution. 
26 We are facing again the problem of representation of fictional entities. For reasons already invoked (that I am 
interested in the inferences within the representation, and not as being about their target), I will ignore this 
problem here. To be clear: what I call the “representation”, here, is the equation, not the pendulum. For a 
detailed account of how fictions themselves work as representations, see (Frigg, 2009). 
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systems, thus learning the meaning of the laws of mechanics, by writing and solving the 
equations for what Kuhn (1974) calls an “exemplar”27. All these practices, where particular 
representations are constructed and manipulated in order to deepen one’s understanding of a 
theory are precisely what I mean by “theorising”. 
Back to the pendulum. One can represent its motion by a differential equation of the 
form of Newton’s Second Law (  
! 
r 
F = m
r 
a ), where the force   
! 
r 
F  is specified: 
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r 
a = "
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( x cos )( ), with   
! 
r 
a  standing for the acceleration, m for the mass of the bob, x for 
the position of the bob, l for the length of the thread, g for the gravitational force, and 
! 
"  for 
the angle of oscillation. Knowing the initial conditions at time t0, one can write down the 
corresponding differential equations. The following step it to solve them. The solutions of the 
equations enable one to give the precise value of the position of the bob at time t. According 
to the information one is seeking (general evolution, precise values…), one might also draw 
the graph of these solutions within two instants t1 and t2. 
However, some mechanical problems cannot, in practice, be solved that way (for all 
agents). This is, for instance, the case for constrained systems28. In such cases, the very task 
of writing down the Newtonian equations of motion is practically impossible, because the 
forces maintaining the constraints are unknown. For this kind of problem, the analytical 
formulation is more tractable, since one does not need to specify the local equations of the 
forces acting on the system at any instant. Knowing the constraints of the system enables one 
to describe it in terms of generalised coordinates29, from which one can draw the Lagrangian 
L of the system, which is, in simple cases, the difference of its kinetic and potential energies. 
Hamilton’s principle (
! 
"A = 0) prescribes that the integral A of L between t1 and t2 be 
stationary. From this principle, one can draw the Lagrangian equations of motion, which have 
the following form: 
! 
d
dt
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) 0 . 
Like the Newtonian equations, to which they can be proven to be equivalent, the 
Lagrangian equations are second order differential equations. In some cases, although one can 
write them down by the procedure described above, they do not have analytical solutions, and 
                                                
27 Exemplars are typical problems given one finds in handbooks as exercises for the students. 
28 A system is constrained when its different points cannot move independently because of internal forces 
relating them. 
29 Generalised coordinates take into account the constraints of the system, and correspond to its degrees of 
freedom. 
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are therefore intractable. The Hamiltonian formulation offers a solution to such cases: by 
using a different kind of generalised coordinates30, one obtains first order differential 
equations. The so-called Legendre transformations enable one to change an intractable 
Lagrangian equation into two corresponding Hamiltonian equations, which are tractable. 
The equivalence of the equations of motion in their Newtonian, Lagrangian and 
Hamiltonian form, and of Hamilton’s Principle, can be easily shown at an abstract level 
(when they do not have any representational content). Therefore, the particular 
representations one can construct with them are, in principle, equivalent, in the sense that they 
have the same informational content. Nevertheless, their inferential enabling, in practice, is 
different. Writing down the equations by specifying the vectorial quantities representing the 
forces acting on the system at instant t0, or obtaining them by determining scalar quantities 
(energies) and by relying on a variational principle (Hamilton’s principle), which concerns the 
trajectory taken globally, does certainly not consist in the same inferential processes. Once the 
equations are written, solving them does not, again, require the same cognitive cost. 
According to the case at hand, one will rather use one or the other formulation. 
These differences in inferential order and in cognitive cost can be assessed without a 
reference to the cognitive abilities of particular agents. Now, describing the various equations 
and principles of mechanics as being equivalent representations in different formats enable us 
shed light on at least two more aspects of theorising, where individual agents get into the 
picture. 
Throughout their history, and in particular during the XIXth century31, the principles 
of mechanics have been the object of various philosophical or meta-scientific reflections 
among physicists, who worked towards the most intelligible and “rational” presentation of 
these principles. According to their reasoning style32, theoretical commitments, and 
assessments of what it is for a theory to be intelligible and explanatory33, different physicists 
do not present the principles of mechanics in the same order: some consider that the whole 
theory is “implicitly” contained in the Newtonian equations34, others claim that D’Alembert’s 
                                                
30 Lagrangian generalised coordinates have the dimension of positions and of velocities, whereas Hamiltonian 
ones have the dimension of positions and momenta. 
31 See, e.g., Hertz and 1894, Mach, 1883. 
32 Think of Maxwell’s (1890) reflections on the use of visual analogies. 
33 See e.g. Mach’s (1883) notion of “economy of thought”. 
34 This view is advocated by Mach (1883), whereas Duhem (1903) argues for a genuine difference between 
force-based and energy-based explanations. 
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Principle “says” something more than Newton’s Law35; some handbooks deduce the 
Lagrangian equations from D’Alembert’s Principle, others chose to deduce them from 
Hamilton’s Principle, etc. According to which principle is taken as fundamental, and in which 
order other principles are drawn from it, the whole edifice of mechanics, and each of its 
principles, look slightly different. Therefore, in addition to saying that Newtonian and 
Lagrangian equations are not in the same format, one can claim that Newton’s Second Law, 
for instance, is not in the same format for someone who takes it as fundamental, and for 
someone who prefers to start from a variational principle36: although the logical relations 
between these principles are independent of such order, the inferences one will typically draw 
are different. And this gives a meaning to the claim that there is a conceptual37 difference – 
despite logical and empirical equivalence38 – between Newtonian and Lagrangian 
representations of motion39. Moreover, the historical development of mechanics, which relied 
in mathematical developments rather than on empirical novelties, can be described as a 
process of changing the formats of the various principles, by inquiring into their mathematical 
consequences, thus showing unnoticed relations and equivalence between them, and 
modifying their inferential enabling40. 
Finally, as I suggested at the end of section 2, formats give us a tool to describe what 
becoming an expert and understanding a theory consist in. Learning mechanics is a process of 
                                                
35 See Lanczos’ (1970) reflections on what he calls the “A-postulate”, and Butterfield’s (2004) comments on 
them. 
36 This echoes Kuhn’s (1970) view that Newton’s Law, as it is given in Newton’s theory, does not have the same 
meaning as when it is deduced from Einstein’s theory. However, here, there is an intra-theoretical “conceptual” 
difference, without any logical difference. 
37 So-called “conceptual (or inferential) role semantics”, as advocated by Gilbert Harman (1982, 1987), defines 
the content of mental representations and linguistic expressions (note that Greenberg & Harman also consider 
non linguistic representations, such as maps), as its role in the cognitive life of agents. The psychological version 
of Harman results in divorcing semantics from considerations of truth-conditions. As clearly appears, my 
account is in agreement with such approach. 
38 Feynman (1965) speaks of a “psychological difference” within “scientifically equivalent” theories. 
39 As Kuhn (1974) claims, understanding a theory is a matter of know-how as much as of know-that. Learning 
how to use a “symbolic generalisation”, such as   
! 
r 
F = m
r 
a , and acquiring a certain world-view (a picture of the 
world as Newtonian), is one and the same thing. Therefore, there is a sense in which one does not “see” the 
world the same way when using Newtonian equations or Hamilton’s principle. 
40 See Anouk Barberousse (2008) description of Hamilton’s work as a process of “making explicit”, in 
Brandom’s (2000) sense, the content of Newtonian mechanics. It shows in which sense one can speak of 
“conceptual change” without there being changes in truth-conditions. 
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getting trained to use its various equations according to the problem at hand, and might result 
in being able to “see” easily the typical form of the solutions of an equation by reading it41, as 
well as to transform it into another, more tractable equation, and thus to see in a more 
immediate way the equivalence of various formulations of the same content. In other words, 
learning, like developing a theory, consists in changing the formats of its different principles, 
by reducing the distance between them42. Note that experts are much more prone to state the 
equivalence of the various principles of mechanics, than novices who are generally struck by 
their difference and who have the feeling that representations of a pendulum in Newtonian 
and Hamiltonian formulations do not give the same explanation of its motion. Showing their 
equivalence is cognitively more costly for novices than for experts. Their formats are, for the 
novice, more distant to each other than for the expert. 
 
 
3.2 Feynman’s Diagrams 
 
As a second example of the fruitfulness of the notion of format, I will briefly consider 
some issues raised by the case of Feynman’s Diagrams. For historical and technical details, I 
refer the reader to the works of David Kaiser (2000, 2005), from which I drew all my 
material. 
Feynman first introduced his famous diagrams in 1948, as a mean to help physicists 
get rid off the infinities of quantum electrodynamics (QED), which prevented them to give 
predictions about complex interactions of atomic particles. At that time, he presented them as 
“mnemonic devices” (Kaiser, 2000, 52) to complete complex high order calculations43 
without confusing or omitting terms; “they were a form of bookkeeping” (ibid.). A year later, 
Dyson (1949a,b) demonstrated the equivalence of Feynman’s diagrams with the mathematical 
derivations given at the same time by Schwinger (1948a,b) as a workable calculational 
                                                
41 See De Regt & Dieks’ (2005, 151): “A scientific theory T is intelligible for scientists (in context C) if they can 
recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact calculations.” They report that 
Heisenberg (1927, 172) and Feynman (et al., 1965, vol. 2, 2-1) express similar views. 
42 See Andrea Woody’s (2004, 792) notion of “articulate awareness” within a representational scheme as a 
“hallmark of nontrivial knowledge”. 
43 The process called “renormalisation” consisted in approaching the solutions for complex interactions by 
adding higher-order corrections to solutions of less complex situations. 
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scheme for QED. Moreover, Dyson made Feynman’s methods “available to the public”44, by 
codifying the rules for constructing the diagrams, on the basis of a one-to-one correspondence 
of features of the diagrams to particular mathematical expressions. As is well known, this was 
the beginning of an amazingly successful career for these diagrams, which, as Kaiser (2005) 
tells in details, were eventually used in almost every field of theoretical physics. 
In some obvious sense, Feynman’s diagrams and their corresponding mathematical 
formulae – along the lines of the rules of derivation given by Dyson – have the same 
informational content, though different inferential enablings. Such differences are handled by 
various deep analyses about visual or diagrammatic reasoning, and its role for agents’ 
problem-solving abilities, as mentioned in section 2. As in the case of mechanics, I suggest 
that attention to such differences in formats, which are obvious when one looks at concrete 
problem-solving tasks, is also fruitful for a study of theorising: one does not have the same 
understanding of the general theoretical framework one is exploring, developing, or learning 
when one uses a mathematical formula or a diagram. This is a way to give a precise sense to 
Kaiser’s (2005, 75) suggestive remark, that Dyson demonstrated “the mathematical – though 
by no means conceptual – equivalence between Schwinger’s and Feynman’s formalisms.” 
Now, the interest of the case of Feynman’s diagrams for a study of the importance of 
formats in theorising is not exhausted by such remarks. Indeed, the diagrams themselves 
happen to be in different formats45 for different users, as Kaiser’s (2005) analysis of the 
“Feynman-Dyson split” shows. Relying on explicit remarks they wrote in letters and personal 
papers, he indeed shows that Feynman’s and Dyson’s use and assessment of the status of the 
diagrams within QED was different to many respects. 
Dyson’s application to showing the rules of derivations of the diagrams was a sign of 
his conception of them as secondary, psychological aid to perform mathematical calculations. 
If they had not been proven rigorously derivable from mathematical formulae, their use would 
not have been legitimate46. He conceived of them as means to “visuali[se] the formulae which 
we derive rigorously from field theory” (Dyson, 1951, 129-130, quoted in Kaiser, 2005, 190). 
Hence, to him, they had a meaning only within QED, to which they added nothing except 
cognitive tractability. 
                                                
44 Dyson, Letter to his parents, 4 Dec. 1948, quoted by Kaiser (2005, 77). 
45 Kaiser (2005) gives an impressive analysis of the “plasticity” of diagrams throughout their “spreading” in 
theoretical practices in modern physics, and of their varying uses and interpretations in different context. 
46 Dyson (1979, 62) writes that “until the rules were codified and made mathematically precise, [he] could not 
call [Feynman’s method] a theory.” 
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On the other hand, Kaiser reports that Feynman never felt the need to show how to 
derive diagrams from mathematical expressions, and expressed clearly in various occasions 
his theoretical preference for diagrams over mathematical formulae: “All the mathematical 
proofs were later discoveries that I don’t thoroughly understand but the physical ideas I think 
are very simple.” (Feynman, Letter to Ted Welton, 16 Nov. 1949, quoted in Kaiser, 2005, 
178) 47. Hence, contrary to Dyson, he thought of them as primary and more important than 
any mathematical derivation they might be given. In addition to being mnemonic devices, 
they provided an intuitive dimension to the theory, and Feynman took them as “intuitive 
pictures” (Kaiser, 2005, 176): as Dyson notes, Feynman “regard[ed] the graph as a picture of 
an actual process which is occurring physically in space-time”48. Rather than visualisations of 
the formulae, they were primary visualisations of the physical processes themselves. 
As Kaiser suggests, this difference in use by the two physicists was based on different 
theoretical commitments and preferences. Contrary to Dyson, who demonstrated how to cast 
both Feynman’s diagrams and Schwinger’s equations within a consistent field-theoretic 
framework49, Feynman’s renormalisation approach, from which the diagrammatic method 
arose, was based on particles, rather than on fields, as the primary ingredients of his theory 
(Kaiser, 2005). And, in 1949, he explicitly divorced the diagrams from QED. More generally, 
as Kaiser notes, Feynman had a preference for a semi-classical approach, and worked almost 
entirely in terms of particles, trying to remove fields from theoretical descriptions altogether. 
This is an interesting case of the same representation being in two formats for two 
different experts. The diagrams have different inferential enablings for Dyson and Feynman: 
they stand in a reverse inferential order for the two physicists, who do not even draw them the 
same way, since Dyson deduces them from mathematical formulae, whereas Feynman draws 
them intuitively. Nevertheless, it makes sense to claim that they have the same informational 
content, at least in some cases. Feynman does not reject the proof of the deducibility of 
diagrams from formulae, whereas they are not relevant for him to see the meaning of his 
diagrams, which he takes to be full-blown representations of the phenomena. 
I suggest, finally, that this sheds light on what I take to be an important feature of 
highly theoretical science, in addition to the other points already mentioned. Contrary to the 
“toy” examples taken in section 2, the nature of the “target” of the representation is far from 
                                                
47 He also spoke of the “physical plausibility” of the diagrammatic approach (quoted in Kaiser, 2005, 177). 
48 Dyson, 1951, 127 (quoted in Kaiser, 190). 
49 Dyson (1965, 23) claims that he contributed to allow “people like Pauli who believed in field theory to draw 
Feynman diagrams without abandoning their principles”. 
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being a trivial issue, and has been the object of one of the most difficult problem in 
philosophy of science, namely the question of the reference of theoretical terms and of 
scientific realism, which is (fortunately) not in the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I suggest 
that attention to the representations that are used in theorising from the perspective of the 
inferences they enable different agents to do can shed a new light on such issues: different 
scientists50, according to their individual theoretical commitments and skills, do not use the 
same representation the same way, which means that they relate it differently to other 
representations, and, finally, to the physical world51. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Theories have most of the time been approached as representational wholes, from 
what Humphreys (2004) calls a “no-ownership perspective”. They are nevertheless complex 
entities, which are always constructed, developed, learned, and hence understood, from the 
point of view of individual cognitive agents. Approaching theorising by focusing on the 
interaction between agents and concrete devices displaying information in a particular form, 
thus gathering different issues which are usually not treated under the same heading (theory 
development, individual scientists’ ontological commitments, expert versus novice 
understanding of theories), seems a promising path to understanding how computational and 
representational aspects of theorising relate. When it comes to highly theoretical issues, it is 
worth paying attention to computation and to forms of reasoning, rather than exclusively 
focusing on the representational relationship between theories – or models – and the world. 
The approach I have advocated, which consists in focusing on particular devices and 
in analysing them in terms of formats, is, I suggest, a way to enlighten aspects of theorising, 
which have usually been studied from much more global perspectives. Indeed, contextual 
                                                
50 This can of course be extended to the scale of communities. Another interesting case, which I study in another 
paper, is provided by the debates around linkage mapping in the 1920’s, where maps are alternatively taken to be 
spatial visualisations of numerical data and “pictorial” – in some broad sense – visualisations of the 
chromosomes. I suggest that such an ambiguity in the meaning of representations, far from being pathological, is 
characteristic of highly theoretical science. Many historical debates happen to be controversies about the best 
format to use. 
51 What this example suggests is something along the lines of what Humphreys (2004, 82, 83) calls “selective 
realism”. Kuhn (1974) also suggests that different scientists using the same symbolic generalisations can have 
different epistemic attitudes towards them, which are related to their own “ontology”. 
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relativity of theory understanding has usually been approached by philosophers of science 
through global units of analysis such as Quinean “conceptual schemes” and Kuhn’s (1970) 
“paradigms”. Hacking’s (1982, 1992) “styles of reasoning” and Kitcher’s (1989) “argument 
patterns” put more emphasis on reasoning schemes, but are still quite general and abstract52. 
The notion of format is intended to enable us capturing these important aspects of theorising, 
by studying concrete local units, in interaction with individual agents. 
 
                                                
52 Note, however, Andrea Woody’s (2004) analysis of diagrammatic representational schemes in crystal field 
theory as explanatory standards along the line of Kitcher’s argument patterns. 
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